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SOME MAJOR PROVISIONS IN MODERN
INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENTS*
Palitha T.B. Kohona**
BACKGROUND
Over the last three decades various countries have developed a network
of intergovernment agreements designed to promote and protect foreign
investments. In 1968, as a response to the increasing international enthu-
siasm for such agreements, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) produced the model Convention on the Pro-
tection of Foreign Property and this model has been employed as the
basis for numerous bilateral investment protection agreements (IPA).' The
International Chamber of Commerce similarly adopted its Guidelines for
International Investments in 1972.2 The United States traditionally relied
on Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaties for the protection of
American persons and property abroad. However, recognising the effi-
ciency of specialised agreements for the protection of investments, it
developed the Prototype Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments in 1983 (United States Prototype).' Since
* The original version of this paper was presented to the CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, Peking University, Beijing, People's Republic of China,
June 17, 18 and 19, 1987.
** LL.B. (Hons.) (Sri Lanka), LL.M. Australian National University, Ph.D. (Cantab.);
presently of the Treaties Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia. The views expressed in
this paper should not be attributed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Australia.
1. OECD Publication, No. 23081, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 117 (1968); [hereinafter
referred to as OECD Model].
2. See Horn, International Rules for Multinational Enterprise: The ICC, OECD, and ILO
Initiatives, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 923 (1981).
3. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Reagan Administration Initiates Bilateral
Investment Treaty Negotiations, 1 Jan. 1982 (press release). Under the "Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program" negotiations have commenced on the basis of the Prototype with Bangladesh, Costa Rica,
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, Honduras and China. Forty other countries have also been
approached.
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then, the United States has employed this prototype in concluding agree-
ments with Panama and Egypt for the promotion and protection of
investments. The European Economic Community (EEC) and African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are examining the possibility of
concluding project-specific IPAs in the minerals sector in the context of
the second Lome Convention. The European-Arab dialogue on a multi-
lateral investment convention has reached an advanced stage.
By 1984, OECD countries alone had concluded over 180 investment
protection agreements with other countries.4 West Germany accounted for
over 60 of these. The trend in the past has been for IPAs to be relied
upon by developed countries to protect the investments of their nationals
in developing countries. A recent feature has been the conclusion of such
agreements between Less Developed Countries (LDC) (e.g. Egypt and
Sudan, Kuwait and Iraq), Newly Industrializing Countries (e.g. Singapore),
Socialist countries (e.g. Romania) and even developed countries themselves
(Italy and Canada).'
China has concluded a number of IPAs6 with its major trading partners
because foreign investments are to play a vital role in its modernisation
plans and the importance of ensuring a secure investment climate for
foreign investors is recognised by China's planners. Accordingly, in ad-
dition to rapidly developing its domestic legal framework as it affects
foreign investments, it has proceeded on a programme of concluding IPAs
with a number of countries which are significant in an economic sense.
China, mainly in order to secure supplies for its expanding industrial
sector, has also made investments in a number of other countries and is
presently examining the possibility of further investments abroad, including
in Australia. Thus, IPAs are important for China from the point of view
of protecting its investments in other countries as well.
MODERN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENTS
IPAs concluded in recent years contain a number of common provi-
sions which are designed to provide specific protection to foreign invest-
ments in host countries. Some IPAs are more specific than others in the
4. See Appendix A.
5. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bilateral Investment].
6. China has already concluded sixteen IPAs, with its trading partners including the U.K.,
the Netherlands, FRG, France and Sweden. It is in the process of negotiating IPAs with a number
of other countries including the USA, Japan and New Zealand.
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treatment of their subject matter, while some others, particularly due to
the need to balance the often competing interests of the states-parties to
them, tend to be less specific and incorporate general principles and
intentions of good will.
Many principles incorporated in modern IPAs are drawn from the
rules of customary international law relating to the protection of foreign-
owned property. These international law principles are useful both to
draftsmen of IPAs and to legal advisors who assist in their implementation.
The interpretation of such provisions in IPAs would require reliance to
be placed on the rules of customary international law and state practice.
There are times when the principles drawn from the general rules of
international law are adapted to suit the needs of a particular bilateral
relationship-making interpretation and implementation a more difficult
task. One effect of the practice of drawing on the principles of interna-
tional law in drafting IPAs is that the relevant principles themselves are
being subjected to further development in the process.
The principal objective of this paper is to discuss some of the major
principles incorporated in modern IPAs.
DEFINITIONS USED IN IPAs
Articles containing definitions in modern IPAs are carefully drafted.
The definitions that are used may determine the scope of an IPA. Thus,
depending on whether the parties wish their agreement to be more com-
prehensive or less comprehensive, and depending on the manner in which
they wish to regulate their bilateral legal relationship relating to invest-
ments from each other in their respective territories, terms such as in-
vestment, company, national, and so forth are defined expansively or
narrowly or even vaguely.
Investments
The general practice is to adopt a very broad definition of the term
"investment." ' 7 The OECD model defines the term "property" (and not
"investments") as "all property, rights and interests, whether held directly
or indirectly, including the interest which a member of a company is
deemed to have in the property of a company." The France-People's
Republic of China (PRC) IPA states that "[t]he term investment means
every kind of goods, rights and interests of whatever nature, in particular
7. E.g., by Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom and Sweden.
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though not limited to the following [different types of property]." 8 The
Federal Republic of Germany-People's Republic of China IPA contains
the following definition: "The term investment shall comprise every kind
of asset admissible under the currently valid legal provisions of a Con-
tracting Party, in particular, but not exclusively. . .. "9 The United States
Prototype states, "Investment means every kind of asset, owned or
controlled directly or indirectly, by nationals or companies of one Party,
including equity, debt and service and investment contracts, and includes
but is not limited to . . . . " It would seem that a broad definition of the
term has been preferred by the parties to the above IPAs. The United
States Prototype includes the following in the definition:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages,
liens and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or
interests in the assets thereof;
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic
value and associated with an investment;
(iv) intellectual and industrial property rights, including rights with
respect to copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade names, industrial
designs, trade secrets, know-how and goodwill;
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, including rights to search
for or utilise natural resources, and rights to manufacture, use and
sell products; and
(vi) returns which are reinvested.
Any alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested
shall not affect their character as investments. 1°
The IPA between China and the United Kingdom defines investments to
mean every kind of asset and goes on to detail various types of assets."
It would appear that a comprehensive effort has been made to encom-
pass all types of assets within the term investment. This approach, while
recognising the advantages that accrue through it to all persons who take
8. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of France and the Government of
the People's Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 30
May 1984 (France-PRC IPA).
9. See Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of China
on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Capital Investment, 20 December 1984 (FRG-PRC IPA).
10. Art. 1, United States Prototype (1985).
11. Art. 1, Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Protection
and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments (UK-PRC IPA), UKTS No. 33 (1986); also see, Art.
1, Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments Between the Government of the Kingdom of
Sweden and the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 March 1982 (Sweden-PRC IPA).
MODERN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENTS
risks in investing directly or indirectly in other countries, also acknowledges
that the meanings attached to various terms which describe types of assets
could vary in different legal systems. Therefore, instead of relying purely
on the terminology which identifies broad categories of assets in the
mature western legal systems, it makes an effort to describe different
types of assets in detail.
Companies
The expression "companies" is generally used in a very loose sense
in IPAs to encompass a wide range of entities, regardless of the manner
in which they were constituted, the nature and extent of their liability or
the nature of their ownership. Consequently, even entities which are not
considered to be legal entities in the domestic laws of countries have been
brought within the definition of the term company, e.g., partnerships.
Article I of the United States Prototype, which contains the definitions,
illustrates this approach. 12 It states that a
Company of a Party means any corporation, company, association,
or other organisation that is duly incorporated, constituted, or otherwise
duly organised under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party
or a political subdivision thereof, regardless of whether or not the
entity is organised for pecuniary gain, privately or otherwise owned,
or organised with limited or unlimited liability.
Exclusions
The ability of parties to IPAs to exclude, or exercise the discretion to
exclude, from the benefits under them, companies (as defined) which do
not satisfy a "control or territorial requirement" is recognised in most of
the recently concluded agreements. This is due to the perceived need to
restrict the benefits conferred by IPAs to companies which are genuinely
established in and controlled by the nationals of the parties to these
agreements. For example, the United States Prototype grants a discretion
to the host Contracting Party to deny the benefits of the rights created
by the prototype to any company which is controlled by nationals of a
third country or which has no substantial business interest in the territory
of the other Contracting Party or which is controlled by the nationals of
a country with which normal business relations are not conducted by the
12. Art. 1, United States Prototype (1985).
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host Contracting Party. 3 The last element in this formulation could be
employed to exclude companies of countries with which the United States
has diplomatic or political problems, even if such companies establish
themselves in countries with which the United States has concluded IPAs.
In the Swiss model the principle of control is the significant element for
this purpose. The French model also uses the criterion of direct or indirect
control of companies by nationals of one of the Contracting Parties. A
similar provision is found in the Japan-Sri Lanka agreement on the
protection of investments.14
RIGHT OF ENTRY AND ESTABLISHMENT
Most IPAs generally do not confer an absolute right of entry and
establishment to foreign investors. The right to enter and establish is
generally qualified by being made subject to approval in accordance with
the law and policies of the host state. It is recognised that, despite the
possible advantages of foreign investments, there is a preemptory need to
safeguard the essential interests of the host state in vital areas. The
retention of the right to control entry and establishment of investments
indicates that certain types of foreign investments are not considered to
be of benefit to the host state and would not be permitted. Thus the host
state, acting in accordance with its law and policies, may reject investment
proposals or impose conditions on their entry. The French have adopted
this approach. 5 On the other hand, the United States Prototype, on face
value, takes a more liberal approach. It even grants national treatment to
entry and establishment. However, the protocol attached to the prototype
excludes vast areas of the United States economy from its ambit. 16 The
Netherlands-PRC IPA provides that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall,
within the framework of its laws and legislation, permit and encourage
investments, within its territory, by investors of the other Contracting
Party."17
A clause of this nature in an IPA to which Australia is a party would
ensure that the requirement to notify the Foreign Investments Review
Board in terms of the Foreign Takeovers Act 1975 (Aust.) of intended
13. Art. 1, United States Prototype (1985).
14. Art. 12(2), Japan-Sri Lanka IPA (1982).
15. Art. 2, France-PRC IPA.
16. See supra, "Definitions Used in IPAs."
17. Art. 2, Agreement on Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments Between
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China, 17 June 1985 (Netherlands-
PRC IPA).
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investments or transfers, would be given effect. In addition there is a
whole range of domestic legal requirements in Australia which would be
applicable to foreign investments."8 The Sweden-PRC IPA limits the scope
of the expression "investment" to investments made by investors of one
Contracting Party which are accepted by the other Contracting Party,
subject to its laws and regulations. 19 The UK-PRC IPA provides for each
Contracting Party to encourage and create favourable conditions for
investments subject to its rights to exercise powers conferred by its laws.20
The France-Singapore IPA requires investments by the nationals of one
party in the territory of the other to be approved in writing by the host
government if they are to be covered by the Agreement.
TREATMENT OF INVESTMENTS
It is common for IPAs to contain provisions incorporating certain
general principles of international law on the treatment of foreign invest-
ments in a host country. Briefly, the relevant rules of customary inter-
national law require a host state to respect and protect the property of
nationals of other states situated within its territory. These rules, which
have their origins in the colonial era, have been developed over the years
to safeguard the interests of capital exporting countries. (Their repeated
incorporation in modern IPAs may contribute to their further clarification
and wider acceptance.) 2 However, it is possible that recent developments
in international law, e.g., the evolving concept of the New International
Economic Order, may have had a limiting effect on these rules. 22
Although individual IPAs may have been tailored to meet the specific
needs of particular bilateral relationships, different IPAs have taken a
broadly similar approach when incorporating these rules of international
law on the treatment of foreign investments. The Unitod States Prototype,
in addition to applying them to investments, extends the application of
18. The more important laws included: Banks (Shareholdings) Act, 1973; Banking Act, 1959;
Broadcasting and Television Act, 1974; Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1980; Foreign
Takeovers Act, 1975; Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936; National Companies and Securities Commission
Act, 1976; Reserve Bank Act, 1959; Petroloum (Submerged Lands Act), 1967 (deals with the operation
and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources); Trade Practices Act, 1974; Onshore Petroleum
and Mining exploration is governed by state laws.
19. Arts. I and 2, Sweden-PRC IPA.
20. Art. 2(1), UK-PRC IPA.
21. See Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 249 (1982).
22. See Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of
Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
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these principles to "associated activities" as well. These include the
establishment of agencies and branches; organisation, disposition and
acquisition of companies; the making and enforcement of contracts; the
leasing of real property; the protection of copyrights, patents and trade-
marks; and the borrowing of funds. The various elements of the relevant
rules of international law comprise:
a) Fair and equitable treatment - The IPAs concluded by France
require that investments be guaranteed "just and equitable treatment. ' 23
The United States Prototype provides that the "protection and security
of the investment shall in no case be less than that required by international
law and that the investment be accorded fair and equitable treat-
ment.... "24 A similar provision is found in the OECD model. 25 The
UK-PRC IPA provides for the investments of nationals and companies
of either Party to be accorded fair and equitable treatment at all times.2 6
The generally accepted view is that "fair and equitable treatment" of
foreign investments involves treatment in accordance with a standard
which is not objectively unfair or inequitable from an international
perspective. What is unfair and inequitable in this context would depend
on the circumstances of each case, which would include, inter alia, the
provisions of the relevant IPA and the terms and conditions imposed on
entry. The avoidance of arbitrary and discriminatory application of laws
and regulations by the host state would also constitute an element of fair
and equitable treatment of investments. Usually, the application of a
standard of treatment similar to that which is accorded to nationals is
adequate for this purpose. However, were the standard applied to nationals
to fall short of the international minimum standard, the international
standard would be stricter. It is possible that the international minimum
standard would be less favourable than the national standard.
b) Usual Protection and security - A state is required to provide
protection and security to the property of a national of another state in
its territory. (The OECD model makes provision for this.) 27 Public au-
thorities in a host state are required to protect foreign investments in the
manner in which they would usually protect property of nationals within
the state and involves the exercise of due diligence by them in any action
23. See Art. 36 France-PRC IPA.
24. Art. 11(2), United States Prototype (1985).
25. Art. 1, OECD Model.
26. Art. 2(1), UK-PRC IPA.
27. Art. 1, OECD Model.
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taken in relation to such property. The United States Prototype requires
that protection and security provided to investments shall in no case be
less than that required by international law. 2 The UK-PRC IPA provides
for investments to enjoy constant protection and security in the territory
of the host Contracting Party.29 (This provision is similar to that in the
OECD Model.)
c) Avoidance of unreasonable or discriminatory measures - Article
I of the OECD model requires a host state not to impair the management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investment property by un-
reasonable or discriminatory measures. The British, Dutch and Swiss IPAs
with Singapore require that each party ensure that the management,
operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of investments shall
not be impaired by "unreasonable or discriminatory measures" or "un-
justified and discriminatory" measures." 30 Article 2(2) of the UK-PRC
IPA also states that a Party, without prejudice to its laws and regulations,
shall not take any unreasonable or discriminatory measures against the
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments.
(This formulation exempts acts which could be justified in terms of
domestic laws and regulations.)
In the above IPAs, the prohibition against unreasonable and discrim-
inatory treatment of foreign investments is restricted to the areas of
management, operation, use, maintenance, enjoyment or disposal of the
invested property. Therefore, it could be argued that this element is not
required to be applied in certain areas, for example, to the entry and
establishment of foreign investments. The scope of the term "unreason-
able" and discriminatory has been the subject of judicial interpretation.
Where a power is not exercised in accordance with standards that are
normal in a given legal system, having in view the purpose of that power,
that exercise of power could be categorised as unreasonable.3' Where a
power is abused or misused, an unreasonable exercise of that power would
occur.32 It is not possible to presume that an unreasonable use of power
28. Art. II, United States Prototype (1985).
29. Art. 2(2), UK-PRC IPA.
30. See Art. 2(2), United Kingdom-Singapore Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 1975; Art. 2(1), Switzerland-Singapore Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, 1978.
31. Judge Azevedo, Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission to the United Nations,
1947-48 I.C.J. 57, 80.
32. See Polish Upper Silesia Case and Free Zones of Upper Savoy Case, quoted in Hambro
1, Nos. 100-101, p. 73.
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has taken place. Such an allegation should be clearly established.
Discriminatory treatment in this context would appear to be differ-
entiation introduced in the treatment of foreign investments as a result
of arbitrary domestic measures that is not justified by any rule of
international law or the provisions of a relevant IPA. Such discriminatory
measures need not be expressly directed against the property of a foreign
investor and could be "de facto discrimination."
"Long honoured in customary practice, judicial decisions and treaty
law, this doctrine may now be a matter of jus cogens-part of a newly
emerged general norm of non-discrimination which seeks to forbid all
generic differentiations among people ... for reasons irrelevant to indi-
vidual capabilities and contribution .. . ."" (However, it has been argued
that all general discrimination of aliens is not necessarily unlawful, espe-
cially if the discrimination is in the common interest of the larger com-
munity, in this case the vast majority of nationals in the host state, and
is not incompatible with international minimum standards.) 4 There would
also be an obligation not to discriminate as between different foreigners
in an arbitrary manner. Australia implements a policy of general non-
discrimination towards all foreign investments. 5 One might suggest that
a specific act of discrimination aimed at a national of a Party to an IPA
containing a provision on non-discrimination by the host state, even if
such act is in accordance with the domestic law, would amount to a
breach of the relevant IPA.
MFN TREATMENT
It is common for Parties to IPAs to incorporate a provision on most
favoured nation (MFN) treatment of the investments of each others'
nationals in their respective territories. Such a provision is designed to
ensure that investments made in each others' territories by nationals of
the two Parties would be accorded at least the treatment accorded to the
investments of nationals of other countries investing in the territories of
33. Weston, The New International Economic Order and the Deprivation of Foreign Proprietary
Wealth: Some Reflections Upon the Contemporary International Law of State Responsibility for
Injuries to Aliens in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 95 (R.
Lillich, ed. 1983).
34. See M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HuMAN DIGNITY 756 (1980).
35. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
REGULATIONS RELATING TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: A TECHNICAL PAPER at 258 et seq., U.N.
Doc. ST/CTC/35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as National Legislation and Regulations].
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the Parties. A provision of this nature would further strengthen the other
articles of an IPA on the treatment of investments.
MFN treatment could be limited to specific areas, e.g., in the avoidance
of unreasonable and discriminatory treatment. Article 64 of the second
Lome Convention between the EEC and the ACP countries permits each
EEC member state to seek from the ACP state concerned the same
treatment that is granted to any other EEC member with regard to
investments. The UK-PRC IPA states that neither Party shall, in its
territory, subject investments or returns of nationals or companies of the
other Party to treatment less favourable than that it accords to investments
or returns of nationals or companies of any third state. It also requires
similar MFN treatment to be granted to the management, use, enjoyment
and disposal of investments.3 6 Exceptions to the provision on MFN
treatment in IPAs are usually provided for in cases where a Party is a
member of a customs union, common market, free trade association or
a regional economic integration agreement. A further exception is made
where a Party concluded a double taxation agreement with another
country."
NATIONAL TREATMENT
A difficult provision contained in some IPAs relates to "national
treatment" of foreign investments. A provision on national treatment
requires that foreign investments of the other Party to an IPA be accorded
the same treatment as equivalent domestic investments. The United States
Prototype contains a provision on national treatment.3" The Singapore-
West Germany Agreement and the Singapore-Netherlands Agreement also
provide for the national treatment of foreign investments covered by
them. 9 There is no provision on national treatment in the OECD model.
This is a reflection of the lack of agreement on the need for such a
provision even among OECD countries.
China agreed to the incorporation of a provision on national treatment
in its IPA with the United Kingdom as follows:
In addition to the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article
either Contracting Party shall to the extent possible, accord treatment
36. Art. 3, UK-PRC IPA.
37. See Art. 4, UK-PRC IPA.
38. Art. II, United States Prototype (1985).
39. See Art. VII, Netherlands Singapore Agreement on Economic Cooperation, 1972; Arts. 2,
3 Germany-Singapore Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
1973.
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in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to the
investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party
the same as that accorded to its own nationals or companies.4
It is noted that the obligation to grant national treatment is qualified by
the phrase "to the extent possible" and, furthermore, such treatment is
required to be granted only in accordance with its laws and regulations.
It has been argued in the past that a provision on national treatment
might not be acceptable to foreign entities investing in China mainly
because Chinese enterprises have special obligations towards the State.
For example, they are required to make contributions over and above the
normal requirement in the event of national emergencies.
In a country like Australia it would be difficult to grant national
treatment to all foreign investments due to the existence of certain con-
straints on such investments. For example, there are constraints relating
to entry and establishment as well as disposal of assets. These areas have
been subject to separate treatment due to the need to protect the national
interest. It is noted that although the United States Prototype of 1983
contained a provision on national treatment, it also contained an annex
which excluded vast areas of the United States economy from its scope.
The relevant areas were: air transportation; ocean and coastal shipping;
banking; insurance; government procurement; government grants; govern-
ment insurance and loan programs; energy and power production; custom
house brokers; ownership of real estate; radio and television broadcasting;
telephone and telegraph services; submarine cable services; satellite com-
munications; and use of land and natural resources. 41
Recent drafts of the United States Prototype exclude foreign invest-
ments from a more limited area of the economy. However, it is possible
for both parties to an IPA to extend the scope of this exclusion by mutual
agreement .42
ENTRY AND SOJOURN OF PERSONNEL
IPAs could make provision specifically requiring the Parties to permit
natural persons of each other who are nationals and personnel employed
by their respective companies to enter and remain in each other's territories
for purposes connected with investment-related activities. Similarly, pro-
vision could be made for the Parties to permit each other's companies to
40. Art. 3(3), UK-PRC IPA.
41. Art. 1l(3)(a), United States Prototype (1983).
42. Para. 5 of Protocol, United States Prototype (1985).
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engage key personnel, irrespective of citizenship, for purposes associated
with investments. 43 A provision of this nature is necessary to ensure that
a foreign investor is able to bring in personnel from outside the host
country, either because the necessary skills are not available in the country
itself or because of the need to ensure that the foreign investor enjoys
the freedom to safeguard his investment by placing key personnel of his
choice to occupy vital positions in his venture.
Obligations of this nature in IPAs are generally qualified to some
extent by being made subject to the laws and policies of the host state
relating to the entry and sojourn of non-citizens. This is necessary in
order not to cause major difficulties to the implementation of domestic
laws and policies relating to the entry and exit of non-citizens. It is
common for most countries to have laws regulating the employment of
foreigners.
AccEss TO COURTS
Nationals of the Parties to an IPA who make investments are usually
permitted full access to the courts and other adjudicatory bodies in the
host state to resolve disputes arising from their investment activities. This
is designed to ensure that no arbitrary restriction is imposed on the access
to courts or such bodies by the host state. Capital exporting countries
have found it prudent to make specific provisions on the question of
access to domestic tribunals in IPAs concluded with LDCs. Article 4(a)
of the United States Prototype provides that "[e]ach Party shall provide
nationals and companies of the other Party full access to its courts and
other adjudicatory bodies in order to afford a means of asserting claims
and enforcing rights." Article 4(b) provides that
[e]ach Party shall, under its own laws and regulations, permit its
nationals and companies to select means of their choice to settle
disputes with nationals or companies of the other Party relating to
investments and associated activities, including arbitration conducted
in a third country, and shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations,
provide for the recognition and enforcement of awards resulting from
such arbitration. 4"
A provision of this nature, while acknowledging the need to ensure
normal access to domestic tribunals to resolve disputes relating to invest-
ments also recognises the need to exhaust remedies available domestically,
43. Art. II, United States Prototype (1985); also see Art. 4, France-PRC IPA.
44. Art. 2(4), United States Prototype (1985).
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prior to relying on other methods for the resolution of such disputes.
NATIONALISATION AND EXPROPRIATION
It is common for modern IPAs to employ a broad definition of the
terms nationalisation and expropriation. They usually include in their
meaning not only the taking of property, but also measures curtailing or
limiting the activities of investors which are equivalent to nationalisation,
i.e., indirect, concealed or creeping nationalisation. The Japan-Egypt IPA
states that "[i]nvestments and returns . . . shall not be subject to expro-
priation, nationalisation, restriction or any other measures, the effects of
which would be tantamount to expropriation, nationalisation or restric-
tion." 45 A provision of this nature prevents the taking of any measures,
directly or indirectly, to nationalise or expropriate investments of nationals
of the other party. Examples of indirect nationalisation and expropriation
are "levying of taxes, the compulsory sale of all or part of such an
investment or the impairment or deprivation of its management, control
or economic value. ' 46 The UK-PRC IPA provides that "[i]nvestments of
nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be expropri-
ated, nationalised or subject to measures having effect equivalent to
expropriation or nationalisation . ... 47
The inclination of capital exporting countries would be to impose
strict controls on the right of host states relating to expropriation and
nationalisation .4  However, it is recognised in the context of the New
International Economic Order and the assertion by states of their sovereign
right to control their assets and resources, that such strict controls would
be unworkable. Hence provisions are incorporated in IPAs which, while
recognising the right of host states to nationalise or expropriate the
property of non-nationals, also endeavour to ensure that such national-
isation or expropriation would take place within defined guidelines. The
OECD model incorporates these guidelines. These could be summarised
as follows:
a) The measures should be for a public purpose and in the public
interest. This qualification is intended to prevent any measures of nation-
alisation or expropriation being taken for a private or capricious purpose. 49
45. Art. 5(2), Japan-Egypt IPA; also see Art. 4 (and Para. 2, Protocol), FRG-PRC IPA.
46. Art. III, United States Prototype (1985).
47. Art. 5(1), UK-PRC IPA.
48. Weston, supra note 33, at 93.
49. For the difficulties associated with establishing public purpose see Baade, Permanent
Sovereignty Over National Wealth and Resources, in ESSAYS ON EXPROPRIATIONS 23 (R. Miller & R.
Stanger eds. 1967).
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The existence of a public purpose and a public interest should be objec-
tively established, and once this is done it is immaterial whether the title
to the expropriated or nationalised property passes to the host state or to
any other entity. The UK-PRC IPA permits nationalisations or expropri-
ations where they are for a public purpose related to the internal needs
of a Contracting Party. 0 Similarly, the France-PRC IPA permits measures
of nationalisation or expropriation where such acts are done in the public
interest. 1
b) The measures should be in accordance with law. In stating this
requirement the Netherlands-PRC IPA provides for nationalisation or for
similar measures to be taken under legal procedure. 2 The Sweden-PRC
IPA contains a similar provision." The American concept 4 which broadly
incorporates this principle, is "due process," which is similar to the
continental concept of "Rechtsstaat," that is, domestic legal procedures
that provide due process of law.
Used in an IPA, the content of this concept is not exhausted by
reference to the national law of the Parties concerned. The "due process
of law" of the Parties is required to correspond to the basic standards
set by international law. "Due process of law," as understood in an
international legal context, essentially requires that whenever a state na-
tionalises or expropriates foreign-owned property, the measures taken
must be free from arbitrariness. Furthermore, safeguards existing in its
laws or established judicial precedent must be adhered to and administra-
tive or judicial machinery used or available must correspond at least to
the minimum standards required by international law. Accordingly, the
term contains both substantive and procedural elements. In this regard it
is also important that the amount of compensation fixed should be subject
to judicial review. It is possible to specify this requirement in the text of
an IPA. For example, the UK-PRC IPA provides that "[t]he national or
company affected shall have a right under the law of the Contracting
Party making the expropriation, to prompt review by a judicial or other
independent authority of that Party, of his or its case and of the valuation
of his or its investment in accordance with the principles set out in this
paragraph." 55 A provision of this nature would not prescribe the form
50. Art. 5(1), UK-PRC IPA.
51. Art. 5(2), France-PRC IPA.
52. Art. 5(IXa), Netherlands-PRC IPA.
53. Art. 3(1), Sweden-PRC IPA.
54. Art. III(l)(b), United States Prototype (1985).
55. Art. 5(l), UK-PRC IPA.
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the judicial review should take, i.e., whether it should be carried out by
judicial or administrative courts, as long as the independence of the judge
or other adjudicator and the fundamentals of fair hearing are ensured.
Those fundamentals include: the right to be heard, if possible, in public;
to have advance knowledge of the rules governing the hearing; and to
adequate representation.
c) The expropriation or nationalisation should not be discriminatory.5 6
The Netherlands-PRC IPA specifically provides that the measures in
question should not be discriminatory.17
d) The measures should be accompanied by provision for "just" and
"effoctive" compensation. This area of the law is full of uncertainties-
a state of affairs reflected by the different formulations employed in
various IPAs. For example, the Netherlands-PRC IPA requires that "the
measures are accompanied by provisions for the payment of compensa-
tion; '"" the UK-PRC IPA simply specifies "reasonable compensation" 5 9
and the France-PRC IPA requires the payment of "prompt and adequate
compensation." 60 The United States has long held on to the concept of
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation." 6
Although capital exporting countries could be expected to support the
United States formulation, it would not find much ready support in
capital importing countries. Capital importing countries, particularly the
less developed ones, have displayed a degree of resistance to the idea of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation for nationalised or expro-
priated foreign property. United Nations and UNCTAD resolutions, which
embody the LDC position on compensation, have clearly rejected the
United States conception of compensation. 62
The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO) states that each state is entitled to determine the
amount of compensation and mode of payment and any dispute arising
56. See supra p. 9.
57. Art. 5(l)(b), Netherlands-PRC IPA.
58. Art. 5(1)(c), Netherlands-PRC IPA.
59. Art. 5(1), UK-PRC IPA.
60. Art. 5(2), France-PRC IPA.
61. RESTATEMENT (2ND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 185-191 (1965).
See Schweber, The Study of the UN's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Rosources,
49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963).
62. See G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973);
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and Programme of Action,
G.A. 4 Res. 3201 & 3202 (S-VI), 29 GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); UNCTAD
Res. 88, 12 U.N. TDOR Supp. (No. 1) at 1, U.N. Doc. ID/B/423 (1973).
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therefrom "should be settled in accordance with the national legislation"
of the host state. 63 The Declaration of 1974 omits any reference to a duty
to compensate in the event of nationalisation or expropriation. Mexico
does not conclude IPA's on the basis that it could not agree to the
settlement of resource related disputes with non nationals by recourse to
third party arbitration.
However, despite the above overt resistance of the LDCs toward
admitting an obligation to pay compensation for nationalised foreign
proporty, the vast majority of nationalisation-related disputes have in fact
been resolved through the payment of some compensation, normally
consistent with the valuation standards prevalent since World War II. 64
In actual practice, there has been a broad acknowledgement of a need to
provide some compensation in the event of nationalisation or expropria-
tion. 65
The concept of "just" compensation, equivalent to "fair compensa-
tion" or "just price," has been subjected to many interpretations .66 It is
broadly recognised that compensation should represent the "genuine value
of the proporty affected" at the moment of deprivation, i.e., the fair
market value of the property. This could be specifically provided for in
IPA's. The Protocol to the FRG-PRC IPA states, "Compensation within
the meaning of Article 4, para. 1 must be in accordance with the value
of the expropriated investment immediately prior to the time when the
expropriation was publicly announced. The investor and the other Con-
tracting Party shall hold consultations to determine this value.' '67 The
UK-PRC IPA requires such compensation to amount to "the real value
of the investment expropriated immediately before the expropriation or
impending expropriation became public knowledge and include interest at
a normal rate, until the date of payment. '68
The determination of the "full value" must initially be by a national
body unless the value of the property or the method of ascertaining it is
stipulated in an agreement between the host government and the investor.
To such assessed value should be added interest from the day of the
63. G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 62, at 52 3.
64. See Amerasinghe, The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalized Property in III Ti
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (R. Lillich ed. 1975).
65. See Art. 5(1), U.K.-Singapore Agreement; also, Art. 5(2), France-PRC IPA.
66. See WESLEY, A COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK FOR EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1975).
67. Art. 4(c), FRG-PRC IPA.
68. Art. 5(1), UK-PRC IPA.
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taking to the day on which compensation is paid. Due to the prevailing
uncertainties relating to exchange and interest rates, parties to IPAs tend
to take care in drafting provisions on the payment of compensation for
nationalised or expropriated foreign property. For example, the UK-PRC
IPA provides that "(such compensation) shall include interest at a normal
rate until the date of payment, shall be made without undue delay, be
effectively realisable and freely transferable. "69
e) There should be an absence of delay. Compensation must be paid
"promptly." For example, the UK-PRC IPA requires that compensation
shall be paid without undue delay. 70 This requirement does not affect the
necessary procedures which are stipulated by domestic law under which
compensation is payable after the measures of deprivation have been
effected. What is required is that the measures constituting the taking of
the property must be "accompanied" by provision for the prompt payment
of compensation-thereby emphasizing the close link, as regards time,
between deprivation, the assessment of compensation, and its receipt.
f) Compensation should be effective and transferable (e.g., the re-
quirement in the UK-PRC IPA under which compensation should "be
effectively realisable and freely transferable").71 Compensation is required
to be paid in a form which is of practical value to the individual or
company entitled to it, having regard to his or its particular situation. It
must be "effective" for the company or individual. For example, a foreign
company should be able to transfer the compensation that it receives to
a currency that is useful to it.
g) Some IPAs make provision for a national of a party who asserts
that his investment has been fully or partly nationalised or expropriated
to seek prompt review by an administrative or judicial tribunal to deter-
mine whether nationalisation or expropriation has in fact taken place, and
if so, that any compensation awarded accords with the laws of the host
state and the relevant IPA. The UK-PRC IPA provides:
The national or company affected shall have a right, under the law
of the Contracting Party making the expropriation, to prompt review,
by a judicial or other independent authority of that Party, of his or
its case and of the valuation of his or its investment in accordance
with the principles set out in this paragraph. 72
69. Art. 5(1), UK-PRC IPA.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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LOSSES SUFFERED DUE TO WAR, CIVIL DISTURBANCE, AND OTHER CRISES
The United States Prototype makes a provision which entitles a
national of a party whose investment suffers losses due to a civil distur-
bance or such other circumstance in the host state to be accorded national,
or, if more favourable, MFN treatment, if the host state were to adopt
any measures relating to such losses." The FRG-PRC IPA provides as
follows:
Investors of one Contracting Party and joint enterprises with the
participation of investors of one Contracting Party who suffer loss of
capital investment in the national territory of the other Contracting
Party through war, other armed combat, a state of national emergency
or other comparable circumstances shall not be discriminated against
by this other Contracting Party as regards all measures pertaining to
these circumstances. 74
This could turn out to be a valuable provision in IPAs concluded with
less developed countries.
TRANSFERS
IPAs generally contain provisions to ensure that all funds relating to
an investment, income derived from the investment, proceeds of any
disinvestment and earnings of personnel are transferable on request. This
is one of the major requirements for which an IPA would be designed to
cater. The OECD model contains a recommendation to this effect. 75 This
particular formulation in the OECD model probably reflects the difficulties
that its draftsmen experienced in obtaining agreement on this provision
and also an awareness of the sensitivities of developing countries.
Some countries, e.g., Germany, Switzerland and the United States,
strongly prefer provisions which ensure total freedom to transfer the above
types of funds, while other countries have agreed on certain restrictions
on this right, e.g., Sweden and the Netherlands. The rationale for having
a provision ensuring the freedom to transfer investment funds appears to
be that it is necessary to reassure investors that they could freely transfer
out of the host country, funds arising from their investments if the need
should arise. The France-Singapore IPA unconditionally guarantees free
transfer of returns on investments, installments in repayment of loans,
73. Art. II, United States Prototype (1985).
74. Art. 4(2), FRG-PRC IPA.
75. Art. 4, OECD Model.
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proceeds from assignments, compensation for nationalisation, and "an
appropriate share of income earned by nationals of either Contracting
Party authorised to work in an approved investment. 7 6 The Sweden-PPC
IPA contains a similar provision.77 The UK-PRC IPA states that "[ejach
Contracting Party guarantees to nationals or companies of the other
Contracting Party the right to transfer freely to the country where they
reside, their investments and returns and any payments made pursuant to
a loan agreement in connection with any investment.' '78 However, this
provision is qualified by the other provisions of Article 6. The right to
transfer such funds has been made subject to the laws and policies of the
host state. This would provide the host state the right to control such
transfers in accordance with its domestic laws and policies.
RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
It has been found necessary to make provisions in IPAs for the
resolution of disputes, both disputes between foreign investors and the
host state and disputes between the States Parties. In certain countries,
due to the absence of acceptable means for settling investment disputes,
foreign investors have faced difficulties in the past. This has contributed
to a diminution of confidence of potential investors. Clear provisions for
the settlement of disputes relating to investments could add to the im-
provement of the necessary climate of confidence. This is one of the
aspects sought to be enhanced by an IPA.
Generally a clear distinction is drawn between investment disputes and
disputes between the parties. The United States Prototype defines invest-
ment disputes between the host state and an investor broadly to mean
disputes involving the interpretation or application of an investment
authorisation granted by the foreign investment authority of a Contracting
Party to a national or company of the other Contracting Party or an
alleged breach by a Contracting Party of any right conferred or created
by the agreement with respect to any investment.7 9 The Netherlands-PRC
IPA refers to disputes between one Contracting Party and an investor of
the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of that investor in
the territory of the former Contracting Party. 0 The UK-PRC IPA makes
76. Arts. 5(1), 5(2), Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
France-Singapore, 1975.
77. Art. 4, Sweden-PRC IPA.
78. Art. 6, UK-PRC IPA.
79. Art. V, United States Prototype (1985).
80. Art. 9(1), Netherlands-PRC IPA.
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provision only for disputes between a national or company of one Con-
tracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an amount of
compensation-to be settled in accordance with a given procedure.8 The
United States Prototype incorporates a clear procedure for the resolution
of investment disputes. As the first step it requires the Contracting Parties
to exhaust informal avenues of dispute resolution, e.g., consultations and
negotiations. This method is a common form of dispute resolution in East
Asia and has the advantage of the parties being able to resolve a dispute
amicably, generally to the satisfaction of all the disputants.
With regard to a country like Australia, such a provision would mean
consultations and negotiations by the aggrieved foreign investor with the
relevant government authority or authorities. If the dispute related to the
interpretation or application of a Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)
authorisation by an investor, the aggrieved foreign investor would be
required to consult with the FIRB, in the first instance, in order to resolve
the dispute. Such informal procedures are commonly employed by foreign
investors in Australia at present to resolve disputes and disagreements
with the FIRB. It is one of the functions of the FIRB "to give guidance,
where necessary, to foreign investors on those aspects of their proposals
that may not be in conformity with Government policy and suggest ways
by which the proposals might be amended. ' '8 2
The United States Prototype provides that, failing such consultations
and negotiations, the aggrieved foreign investor may resort to the admin-
istrative or judicial tribunals available in the host state. The Dutch IPA
with Singapore requires the parties to exhaust local remedies first. 3
Although there is a reluctance (at times unjustified) by investors from
capital exporting countries to rely exclusively on the tribunals of the host
state to resolve investment disputes, it is noted that this is an option made
available to disputants in some of the IPAs concluded with China.8 4 The
Netherlands-PRC IPA provides that where an investment dispute could
not be settled amicably within a period of six months from when a
disputant sought amicable settlement and the parties have not agreed to
any other dispute settlement procedure the investor may choose to do one
or both of the following: a) file a complaint with and seek relief from
81. Art. 7(1), UK-PRC IPA.
82. Summarised from National Legislation and Regulations, supra note 35, at 258-292.
83. Art. XI, Netherlands-Singapore Agreement; Art. 9(3), Netherlands-PRC IPA.
84. See Art. 10, Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Government
of the People's Republic of China Regarding Mutual Investment Encouragement and Protection,
1984 (Belgo-Luxembourg-PRC IPA).
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the competent administrative agency of the host state; and b) file suit
with the competent court of law of the host state.85
As the next step, the United States Prototype makes provision for
investment disputes to be submitted to the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) established by the Washington
Convention of 1965. The ICSID is a readily available avenue to its parties
for the resolution of disputes between host states and foreign investors.
Disputes may be referred to the Centre for resolution through conciliation
and/or arbitration. Sweden and China have made provision for investment
disputes to be referred to the ICSID for resolution, subsequent to the
conclusion of an additional protocol to their IPA, once China accedes to
the Washington Convention. 86 IPAs concluded by the United Kingdom
generally make specific provision for the reference of investment disputes
to the ICSID for resolution. However, there is no provision to refer
investment disputes to the ICSID in the UK-PRC IPA.8 7
Even some IPAs concluded between countries which are not major
exporters of capital, e.g., Egypt and Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and Singapore,
provide for the submission of investment disputes to the ICSID. The
model IPA developed by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee
makes the ICSID one of the options available to disputants for the
settlement of investment disputes. It is noted in this connection that
Australia is currently in the process of completing its domestic consulta-
tions for the purpose of acceding to the Washington Convention. None
of the IPAs concluded so far by China makes the ICSID available as a
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes. (China is not a
party to the Washington Convention at present.)
It is also possible for an IPA to make provision for investment disputes
to be resolved by arbitration. The UK-PRC IPA enables the parties to
investment disputes to rely on international arbitration. It states that
where international arbitration is relied upon, the disputants may agree
to one of the following: a) an international arbitrator appointed by the
disputants; b) an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to be appointed under a special
agreement between the disputants; or c) an ad hoc arbitral tribunal
established under the Rules of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL).88 If three months have elapsed after
85. Art. 9, Netherlands-PRC IPA.
86. This commitment was stated in a side letter to the IPA.
87. See Art. 7, UK-PRC IPA.
88. Art. 7, UK-PRC IPA.
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a dispute has been referred to arbitration and no agreement has been
reached on the appointment of the arbitrator or the ad hoc tribunal, the
parties are bound to submit to arbitration under the Rules of UNCI-
TRAL.89
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES
There could be disputes between parties to an IPA relating to the
interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the IPA itself.
Consultations and negotiations are usually relied upon, in the first in-
stance, to resolve such disputes. Failing this, provision is made for resort
to be had to more formal means of resolving disputes, for example,
arbitration. 9 IPAs concluded by China contain detailed provisions re-
quiring the parties to rely on arbitration for the resolution of such disputes.
The FRG-PRC IPA provides that where a difference of opinion between
the parties cannot be settled by friendly negotiations within six months,
the parties shall submit the matter to an ad hoc court of arbitration. 91
This IPA also makes detailed provisions for the establishment of such
arbitral tribunals and for the adoption of their own procedures.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been recognised by an increasing number of countries that
intergovernmental agreements for the promotion and protection of in-
vestments would encourage the flow of investments. Through the political
guarantees that they provide they reduce to a considerable extent the
political risk attached to foreign investments in a host country and assist
in the creation of a climate of confidence for such investments. Such
agreements also clarify the legal protection available to foreign investors
under the goneral principles of international law. Furthermore, on a
bilateral basis, they could be tailored to meet the specific needs of the
countries which are parties to them and they could be a subtle means of
influencing the approach to international obligations and the domestic
legal framework and policies of some countries.
A major purpose behind the conclusion of large numbers of IPAs by
members of the OECD has been said to be to encourage the wider
acceptance of internationally recognised norms relating to the treatment
89. See also Art. 8, Denmark-PRC IPA.
90. See P. KOHONA, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS THROUGH LAW
169 et seq. (1985) for discussion on arbitration provisions in international economic agreements.
91. Art. 10, FRG-PRC IPA.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1987
of foreign investments particularly by the less developed countries. The
incorporation of international law norms relating to the standard of
treatment of investors (for example, non-discrimination, fair and equitable
treatment and MFN treatment), transfers, nationalisation, expropriation,
compensation and the resolution of disputes is contributing in a significant
way to the evolution of the general rules of international law in this
particular area.
IPAs concluded so far have been, generally, adhered to by the parties
to them. The International Chamber of Commerce has commented:
That these treaties are respected seems to be evident from a large-
scale measure of expropriation from which foreign enterprises protected
by relevant treaties appear to have been deliberately excluded. Moreover,
in two of the three known cases which might have involved breaches
of relevant protective treaties . . . remedial steps were instantly taken
by the developing country concerned. 92
The exceptions to this have been noticeably few. The few breaches of
international bilateral obligations relating to foreign investments have
largely been the result of domestic upheavals, e.g. in Iran, Chile and
Libya. The nature of the relevant political events in those countries was
such that the usefulness of the general rules of international law and
commitments incorporated in bilateral treaties to deal with their effects
on non-nationals was very doubtful anyway. In the final analysis, the
mere existence of an IPA would not by itself be adequate to provide an
absolute guarantee to foreign investments in a country. However, the
existence of an IPA would evidence a favourable investment climate and
an acknowledgement of the rules of law applicable to foreign investments
in a host country.
92. Bilateral Investment, supra note 5, at 5.
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APPENDIX
List of Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements
concluded between OECD Member countries
and developing countries (1984)
Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements
OECD Member
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Luxembourg
Developing
Country
Rumania
Bulgaria
Tunisia
Morocco
Indonesia
Korea
Zaire
Egypt
Rumania
Singapore
Malaysia
Cameroon
Bangladesh
Madagascar
Ivory Coast
Malawi
Indonesia
Rumania
Egypt
Bulgaria
Tunisia
Zaire
Mauritius
Indonesia
Yugoslavia
Egypt
Malaysia
Morocco
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
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OECD Member Developing
Country Country
Singapore
Malta
Rumania
Syria
Korea
Sudan
El Salvador
Paraguay
Sri Lanka
Haiti
Philippines
Liberia
Panama
Germany Pakistan
Malaysia
Togo
Morocco
Liberia
Thailand
Guinea
Cameroon
Madagascar
Sudan
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Senegal
Korea
Philippines
Chile
Ethiopia
India
Niger
Kenya
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Colombia
Ecuador
Cent. Afr. Rep.
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OECD Member
Country
Developing
Country
Congo
Iran
Ivory Coast
Uganda
Zambia
Chad
Rwanda
Ghana
Indonesia
Zaire
Gabon
Mauritius
Haiti
Singapore
Yemen (North)
Egypt
Jordan
Malta
Mali
Syria
Oman
Rumania
Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh
Somalia
Guinea
Malta
Gabon
Ivory Coast
Morocco
Tunisia
Niger
Egypt
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Ivory Coast
Cameroon
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
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OECD Member
Country
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Developing
Country
Uganda
Sudan
Kenya
Malaysia
Morocco
Singapore
Thailand
Korea
Yugoslavia
Egypt
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Madagascar
Indonesia
Egypt
Yugoslavia
Malaysia
Pakistan
China
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Niger
Guinea
Ivory Coast
Senegal
Congo
Cameroon
Liberia
Rwanda
Togo
Madagascar
Malta
Tanzania
Costa Rica
Benin
Honduras
Chad
Ecuador
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OECD Member
Country
Developing
Country
Upper Volta
Korea
Uganda
Gabon
Zaire
Cent. Afr. Rep.
Egypt
Indonesia
Sudan
Mauritania
Jordan
Syria
Singapore
Mali
Malaysia
Sri Lanka
Panama
Egypt
Singapore
Korea
Rumania
Indonesia
Thailand
Jordan
Sri Lanka
Senegal
Bangladesh
Philippines
Lesotho
Papua New Guinea
Malaysia
Paraguay
Sierra Leone
Yemen (North)
Belize
Cameroon
United Kingdom
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Developing
Country
Costa Rica
St. Lucia
Panama
Haiti
China
Mauritius
Egypt
Panama
United States
OECD Member
Country
